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Abstract. Many philosophers argue that the face-value of moral practice provides 
presumptive support to moral realism. This paper analyses such arguments into three 
steps. (1) Moral practice has a certain face-value, (2) only realism can vindicate this face 
value, and (3) the face-value needs vindicating. Two potential problems with such 
arguments are discussed. The first is taking the relevant face-value to involve explicitly 
realist commitments; the second is underestimating the power of non-realist strategies to 
vindicate that face-value. Case studies of each of these errors are presented, drawn from 
the writings of Shafer-Landau, Brink and McNaughton, and from recent work 
experimental metaethics. The paper then considers weak presumptive arguments, 
according to which both realist and non-realist vindications of moral practice are 
possible, but the realist vindications are more natural. It is argued that there is no sense of 
‗natural‘ available that can make these arguments work. The conclusion is that all extant 
presumptive arguments for moral realism fail. In closing remarks, the paper presents 
some further reason to be pessimistic about all possible presumptive arguments in 
metaethics and considers the effect on the shape of the meta-ethical dialectic were this 
conclusion to be accepted. 
 
This paper adopts the conservative aim of exposing a mistake that is increasingly 
prevalent in the metaethical literature. The mistake is supposing the ‗face-value‘, 
‗appearance‘ or ‗pretensions‘ of moral practice to generate a dialectical presumption 
in favor of moral realism. I will argue that, as usually understood, the face-value fails 
to provide even defeasible evidence in favor of any metaethical theory, realist or 
otherwise.
1
 Recognizing this point leads to a radical rethink of the focus of 
metaethical debate and entails that many existing defences of realism (and its rivals) 
are inadequate.  
 
1. Realism and Presumptive Arguments 
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 In a recent paper, Finlay writes: ―Recently, however, some expressivists appear to be shifting to a 
more aggressive and less apologetic posture, maintaining that the appearances don‘t favour realist over 
antirealist views at all‖ (Finlay 2010 p.341). My arguments are in this tradition.  




Moral realism is the view that moral judgments express mental states that represent 
the world as realizing distinctively moral states of affairs (‗cognitivism‘) and that 
there exists a moral reality that these states sometimes correctly represent. For realists, 
the constituents of the world include distinctively moral states of affairs (or facts or 
properties or events, depending on one‘s preferred ontology): in Mackie‘s famous 
phrase (1977 p.15), values are part of the fabric of the world. Realists differ amongst 
themselves regarding the precise nature of this moral reality, for example concerning 
its independence from the attitudes of actual or hypothetical agents, its reducibility to 
other aspects of reality and its relation to the natural world. Some characterizations of 
realism also include the claim that moral judgments are truth-apt and that some of 
them are true. These characterizations of realism are secondary to the one employed 
here, given that truth-aptness and truth can be understood via the notions of belief and 
accurate representation. As understood here, therefore, realism is not the view that 
moral judgments are truth-apt and sometimes true, but a particular theory of the 
semantic functioning of moral judgments that allows us to explain in what sense they 
are truth-apt and sometimes true.  
Opposed to realism are two kinds of antirealism. The first – error-theory – 
accepts cognitivism but denies the realists‘ metaphysical claim. Consequently all 
positive moral judgments are false, though they may be practically valuable in ways 
unconnected to their truth. The second – expressivism – denies that moral judgments 
express moral beliefs (‗non-cognitivism‘). Instead the primary role of moral 
judgments is to express affective attitudes whose contents and expression play a 
distinctive role in the interpersonal co-ordination of attitude and action. According to 
expressivists, the distinctive import of moral judgments arises from such a co-
coordinating role, not from expressing states that offer representations of the way the 
world might (morally) be. So understood, expressivism is prima facie consistent with 
moral judgments being truth-apt and sometimes true. At least, this possibility cannot 
be ruled out independently of a consideration of the debate concerning the nature of 
truth-aptness and truth. In what follows, therefore, the debate between realists and 
expressivists is assumed to to concern not the truth-aptness or truth of moral 
judgments, but the distinctive semantic and psychological function of those 
judgments.  
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According to presumptive arguments for moral realism our moral practice 
possesses certain features which provide defeasible evidence for realism, since only 
realism can vindicate those features. Here ‗moral practice‘ refers to the use of a 
distinctive moral terminology – such as ‗morally good‘, ‗morally right‘, ‗just‘ and 
‗cruel‘ – in public discourse, personal deliberation and any subsequent determination 
of or influence on action. Precisely what makes moral terminology (or the moral use 
of terminology) distinctive is beyond the scope of the present paper: for now it is 
sufficient that both realists and their opponents accept the existence of a distinctive 
moral practice defined by a distinctive moral vocabulary (or vacabulary in a 
distinntive moral use). 
Presumptive arguments can be further analysed into three distinct stages. 
(a) The first is a claim about the face-value of moral practice. The proponent 
of the argument claims that moral practice possesses certain experiential, linguistic or 
discursive forms and that those who engage in that practice make certain assumptions 
when doing so. (I shall refer to these forms and assumptions collectively as ‗features‘ 
of the practice.) Typical experiential forms include: the immediacy of moral 
experience and the apparent worldliness of such experience (that value-as-
experienced is ‗out there‘ in the world, not a feature of ourselves). Typical linguistic 
and discursive forms include: the subject-predicate form of some moral sentences; 
their embedding in logical contexts such as negation; their embedding in other 
contexts such as those of explanation, propositional attitude attribution and truth 
attribution; their featuring in standard infererence patters, such as modus ponens. 
Typical assumptions include: that some actions are right, others wrong; that the 
rightness or wrongness of actions is not dependent on the responses of those judging 
them right or wrong; that the truth or falsity moral judgments is not dependent on the 
responses of those making the judgments; that there are correct answers to moral 
questions; that any given moral judgment may turn out to be false; that moral 
disagreement is possible; that moral discussion is sometimes a fruitful way of 
resolving moral disagreement; that moral claims can be supported by reasons. Some 
presumptive arguments focus exclusively on the experiential forms of moral practice 
and thus as a whole such arguments are sometimes labeled ‗arguments from 
phenomenology‘ (see Kirchin 2003 and Loeb 2007). Yet many of the features of 
moral practice are not easily described as phenomenological, so this label is only 
appropriate if ‗phenomenology‘ is broadly construed. Note also that each feature 
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generates a distinct presumptive argument. Most realists employ a cluster of 
structurally identical presumptive arguments.    
 (b) The second stage is to claim that only moral realism can take moral 
practice at face-value. That is, only realism can vindicate the forms and assumptions 
in question. To vindicate a form or assumption is to justify the continued engagement 
in a practice that exhibits that form or which makes that assumption. Any theory that 
fails to vindicate a form or assumption is ‗revisionary‘ and to that extent implausible.  
The precise content of the claim made at this second stage is often unclear. 
Sometimes it is that only realism can vindicate the features in question, so antirealism 
is necessarily revisionary. Sometimes it is the weaker claim that only realism can 
naturally vindicate these features, so antirealism offers an unnatural or substandard 
vindication. Sometimes it is the still weaker claim that only realism has so far 
vindicated the relevant features, so we cannot say for certain that antirealism is 
revisionary or unnatural, but we know that it is incomplete. This paper will not 
discuss arguments that employ this weakest claim, since they are necessarily hostage 
to further developments in our understanding of antirealism. Arguments that employ 
the first claim may be called ‗strong presumptive arguments‘, those that employ the 
second ‗weak presumptive arguments‘.  
 (c) The third stage of any presumptive argument is typically implicit but is 
necessary to secure validity. It is the claim that the face-value of moral practice 
requires saving. More precisely, it is the claim that the actual features of moral 
discourse are in need of vindication.
2
 Without this assumption, the fact (if it is a fact) 
that only realism can (naturally) vindicate these features would not support realism, 
since it would not be a desideratum on any metaethical theory to do so. With this 
desideratum in place the fact (if it is a fact) that only realism can vindicate these 
features provides defeasible evidence in favor of realism.  
We have then, instructions for the presumptive argument three-step: (1) Moral 
practice has a certain face-value (2) Only realism can save that face-value (3) The 
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 See Timmons 1999 p.12 and McNaughton 1988 pp.16, 64. Note that McNaughton and Timmons 
express this desideratum as the claim that the features of moral practice must be ‗accommodated‘ or 
‗made sense of‘ by metaethical theory. Like Loeb (2007 p.475) I resist these terms because they can 
easily be taken to include not only cases where features are vindicated, but cases where they are given a 
debunking explanation. I argue below (§3) that it is vindication and not accommodation in this broader 
sense that is desirable in metaethics, at least when it comes to those features of moral practice listed in 
§1(a).  





 It is important to note that, even if a presumptive argument 
is successful, it provides only a defeasible case for realism. Presumptive arguments 
show that with respect to one desideratum on metaethical theories – the desideratum 
of vindicating the face-value of moral practice – realism has an advantage over its 
rivals. This is some evidence in favor of realism, but is not conclusive, since there 
may be other desiderata on metaethical theorizing with respect to which realism 
looses its comparative advantage. However, were it to prove that realism was at least 
as good as its rivals in meeting these further desiderata, the comparative advantage it 
carries from saving the face-value of moral practice would turn the presumptive case 
into a decisive one.  
  
2. Actual Presumptive Arguments 
 
Most realists employ presumptive arguments, although the features of moral practice 
that provide the focus for each argument varies considerably. Wiggins (1979) alights 
on the assumption that the correctness of moral choices is determined independently 
of facts about us and claims that antirealist theories must distort this appearance. 
Dancy (1986 p.172) presents an argument fixed on the form of moral experience, in 
particular the experience of moral properties as being ‗in the world‘. McNaughton 
(1988 p.37) also employs claims about moral phenomenology but adds to these claims 
about the assumptions of those who make moral judgments, for example the 
assumption that ‗moral properties are part of the fabric of the world‘ and that the 
veracity of moral judgments is independent of facts about the judge or her 
community.  Nolan et al. (2005 p.307) claim that moral discourse ‗presupposes there 
are objective moral truths‘. Brink (1989 p.25) adds further ingredients, claiming that 
moral practice has certain realist-friendly forms, for example, ‗fact-stating and 
property ascribing form‘. Shafer-Landau (2003 p.23) emphasizes the linguistic forms 
employed in moral discourse, for example the form generated by use of the locution 
‗it is true that…‘, while Majors (2003 p.135) highlights the appearance of moral 
predicates in explaining phrases. Most recently, Finlay (2007 p. 823) discusses what 
he calls the ‗objective pretensions‘ of morality, which include the linguistic forms 
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 It is here worth noting another type of argument for realism that shares the first step of presumptive 
arguments. According to this argument, the face-value of moral practice is not uniquely vindicated by 
realism, rather it entails the truth of realism. See Harcourt 2005 for the argument and Ridge 2006b. 
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generated by the use of the truth-predicate, the contexts of negation, belief and 
knowledge. Many of these authors also talk more broadly of the ‗face-value‘, 
‗pretension‘ or ‗appearance‘ of moral practice, claiming that only realism remains true 
to how things ‗seem‘ (Nolan et al. 2005 p.307) or takes moral claims ‗literally‘ (Brink 
1989 p.23).  
It is noteworthy here that those who present presumptive arguments often 
waiver between the strong and weak forms. This is the difference between arguments 
which hold that only realism can vindicate the face-value and those which hold, more 
weakly, that only realism can naturally vindicate the face value (the implication is that 
antirealist theories can provide the requisite vindication, but that it is an unnatural or 
substandard one). For example, Shafer-Landau implies a weak presumptive argument 
when he claims that ‗non-cognitivism lacks a natural account of moral truth‘ (2003 
p.37, my emphasis). Elsewhere, however, the logic is that of a strong presumptive 
argument, for example in the claim that antirealists ‗must question the 
phenomenology itself, owing to their inability to preserve the appearances in ethics‘ 
(2003 p.104, my emphasis). Brink more consistently offers a strong presumptive 
argument, claiming the antirealism must revise our moral practice in some way: ‗If we 
reject moral realism, it seems we must regard the form and content of our moral 
judgments as misleading and inappropriate‘ (1989 p.26; see also pp.29, 36 and 87). 
But there are also intimations of the weaker argument, in passages such as: ‗…realism 
alone…provides a natural explanation or justification of the way we do and can 
conduct ourselves in moral thought and inquiry‘ (1989 p.24, author‘s own emphasis). 
My discussion of presumptive arguments will keep weak and strong versions distinct, 
since although I think they both fail, they do so for importantly different reasons. 
(One must also be alert to those who try to gain argumentative capital from conflating 
the two types of argument.)  
Despite the confusion between strong and weak forms of the argument, realists 
are generally aware that presumptive arguments by themselves generate only 
defeasible case for realism. McNaughton (1988 p.40) puts the point succinctly: 
 
[This] appeal to the nature of moral experience...represents a starting point 
for an argument, not a conclusion…only a presumption would have been 
established and presumptions can be defeated. 
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Some antirealists accept this presumptive burden and proceed to argue that there are 
distinct considerations against moral realism that outweigh it (see, for example, 
Mackie 1997 pp.36-42). But there is scope for a stronger position according to which 
the presumption in favor of realism is not outweighed but undermined: that is, the 
purported features of moral practice that moral realists take to ground a defeasible 
reason in favor of their theory turn out, on inspection, not to ground any such reason 
at all. This is the position defened in this paper. 
One qualification is necessary before proceeding. The primary aim of this 
paper is to defend the claim that the features of moral practice listed in §1(a) fail to 
provide a presumptive case for realism. I do not claim that all possible presumptive 
arguments fail, since there may be other features of moral practice, not listed here, 
that do create a genuine presumption. Nevertheless the criticisms presented here are 
important insofar as the serve to undermine most of the extant presumptive arguments 
that have been offered, which, as we have just seen, focus on one or other of the 




3. Is Vindication Desirable? 
 
If a particular form or assumption fails to generate a presumption in favor of realism, 
it is because one or more of the three stages of the presumptive argument fails. In a 
recent paper, Loeb has questioned the third stage, at least as it applies to commonly 
discussed assumptions such as the assumption that any of our moral judgements may 
prove incorrect (the assumption of fallibility). Loeb argues that it begs the question 
against error-theorists to suppose that such assumptions require vindication. If 
metaethical enquiry is to leave open the possibility that existing moral practice is in 
irretrievable error in assuming fallibility (for example), then it cannot be a 
requirement on that enquiry that we retain this assumption (see Loeb 2007 pp.475-7). 
In this section I argue that, contra Loeb, at least some of the features of moral practice 
mentioned in §1(a) require vindication. This is to argue in favor of the third stage of 
presumptive arguments as it applies to these features.  
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 One further clarification may be necessary. My targets in this paper are realists – such as Brink and 
Shafer-Landau – who accept a distinction between first-order moral commitments and the second-order 
meta-theory of those commitments, and who hold that the structure or content of the former supports a 
realist view of the latter. For the sake of argument this paper also accepts this distinction. For defences 
of ‗moral objectivity‘ that question this distinction see Dworkin 1996 and Nagel 1997. For critical 
discussion see Blackburn 1998 pp.294-9.  




Why suppose that any of the features of actual moral practice require 
vindication? After all, this is not an assumption that we make about all discursive 
practices, discourse about witches being an obvious example. The distinctness of the 
moral case must lie in the thought that moral practice is, at least in the most part, a 
practice that we have good reason to go on engaging in. This pragmatic assumption is 
supported by the observation that practically all known human societies have 
developed something akin to moral practice (see, for example, Brown 1991 and Joyce 
2007 pp.6406). In addition, careful observation from our own case shows that moral 
practice as a whole allows us to relate to the world, and to others, in worthwhile ways 
that would simply not be possible without it. To consider whether an action is wrong, 
a policy admirable, a state of affairs worthwhile or a character depraved, is to engage 
in a type of practical reflection and discussion that would not be possible without 
moral terminology. Of course, the precise nature of this practical import of morality 
has been much debated. It has been suggested, for example, that it consists in the fact 
that morality is capable of questioning the ultimate ends of action and/or in the fact 
that morality makes demands which are not contingent upon the vicarious desires of 
actual agents. But whatever its precise nature, it is plausible to think that there is some 
such import that is distinctive of moral practice.
5
 Nothing of comparable importance 
is lost through dispensing with discourse about witches.  
It is important, however, not to overstate the scope of the pragmatic 
assumption. The above considerations do not justify the claim that all features of 
moralizing as it is practiced 21
st
 century American society, say, require vindication. 
Indeed there are reasons to think that this is not the case: first because it is unlikely 
that our actual behavior manifests a single teleologically unified practice, second 
because false and inconsistent metatheories may have infested the practice, so that 
some reflective moralizers engage in the practice with a (false) understanding of their 
activities built in. For these reasons, it is likely that any metaethical theory will be 
revisionary of some of the features of actual moral practice, making the requirement 
to vindicate all of these features implausibly strong.  
A more reasonable desideratum holds that a metaethical theory should be able 
to vindicate all of the pragmatically important features of moral discourse. On this 
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 For some realist accounts of this practical import, see Railton 1986 and Wedgwood 2001. For 
antirealist accounts see Blackburn 1998 and Gibbard 1990. 
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view, any actual form or assumption of moral practice that a metatheory asks us to 
revise carries an explanatory cost, but this cost can be met so long as the metatheory 
can show how the important things that we want to say and do using moral practice, 
and all of those substantial debates moral practice involves, are preserved in the 
recommended revised practice (see Stevenson 1937 p.15). For example, it will be no 
good recommending that we replace moralizing with a system of communal chanting, 
if by doing so we lose an important aspect of the way we interact with each other and 
the world. What the pragmatically important aspects of moral practice are will, of 
course, be a matter of metaethical dispute. Thus in order to be plausible a metaethical 
theory must first defend an account of the way moralizing helps us relate in 
worthwhile ways to the world and to each other and then show how, given this 
account, some (if not all) of the features of actual moral practice are to be expected.  
It seems likely that most of the features mentioned in §1(a) are pragmatically 
important and thus in need of vindication. In general this is because only a practice 
which legitimately exhibited these features could allow us relate to the world and to 
each other in the useful ways that moral practice undoubtedly does. To take Loeb‘s 
example: if the assumption of fallibility were to be abandoned then all moral 
discussion and reflection would be futile, since no one would ever be persuaded that 
their moral opinion was incorrect. Yet the abandonment of all moral discussion and 
reflection would leave us with an impoverished set of tools with which to relate to 
each other and the world. Similarly, if moral sentences could not be embedded in 
logical contexts such as negation then all moral argument involving such contexts 
would be impossible. A group of individuals who could not employ the devices of 
logical argument to moral matters in this way would be without an important way of 
relating to each other and the world. Therefore a metaethical theory is defective to the 
extent that it fails to vindicate these features of moral practice. Similar arguments 
apply with respect to the other features mentioned in §1(a). In all cases, human 
interaction would be impoverished should the feature of the practice disappear.  
Note that the desideratum to vindicate pragmatically important features of 
moral practice is not, therefore, an unsupported or question-begging assumption in the 
debate: it is supported by reflection on the way in which moral discourse allows us to 
relate to others and the world in worthwhile ways (even though the precise form of 
these ways is difficult to specify). It is also not a blanket desideratum that 
unthinkingly covers all of the actual features of moral practice, for it allows the 
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possibility that some features of the discourse may not be pragmatically important and 
hence not in need of vindication. A considered metaethical theory, in other words, 
needs to respect the obvious pragmatic importance of moral practice without falling 
into undue reverence of the often highly sociologically contingent forms that practice 
may take. However this balance is struck, ignoring the pragmatic importance of 
morality, as Loeb strategy suggests, is unjustified.  
 
4. Error-theoretic Vindication 
 
Even if it is accepted that metaethical theories must vindicate the features listed in 
§1(a), presumptive arguments that refer to these features might fail in the first two 
stages. Before coming to my own criticisms of these stages, in this section I consider 
an attack on the second stage of presumptive arguments that can made by an error-
theorist.  
The second stage of presumptive arguments holds that only realism can 
vindicate the forms and assumptions of moral practice, where vindication involves 
justifying the continued engagement in a practice that possess these forms or that 
makes these assumptions. In the case where a metatheory justifies the continued 
engagement in a practice that makes a certain assumption, we can distinguish two 
types of vindication. In the first case, an assumption is vindicated because it turns out 
to be true, according to the metatheory. In the second case an assumption is vindicated 
because, although it is not true according to the metatheory, it is an assumption that is 
useful to make in the situations with which the practice is primarily concerned. As an 
example of this second, error-theoretic form of justification, Joyce (2001 pp.206-31) 
has argued that in practical contexts rational agents are justified in assuming that 
some actions are right, others wrong, despite that fact that in their most undistracted, 
reflective and critical moments they must admit that no actions are ever right or 
wrong. Such views are distinct from Loeb‘s, since they accept that the assumption in 
question requires vindication. What they deny is that only realism can vindicate the 
assumption. They thus resist the second stage of presumptive arguments. 
Nevertheless there is an obvious sense in which such vindications are second-
rate in comparison with the realist alternative. For the assumptions of moral practice 
often appear full-blooded in the sense that those who make the assumption consider 
their so doing to be incompatible with admitting a possible context of reflection in 
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which the assumption does not hold. For example, when ordinary moral agents 
assume that some actions are right and others wrong they do so in a way that is 
threatened by the claim that, in some reflective moral context, this isn‘t the case. 
Ordinary moralizers assume that some actions are right, with no qualification (this 
doesn‘t entail that all ordinarly moralizers assume that the same action is right, with 
no qualification). Likewise when ordinary moralisers assume that their moral opinion 
may turn out to be false, they do so in a way that would be threatened by the claim 
that, at some level of reflection, no moral opinion is ever in error. Furthermore, that 
the assumptions of moral practice are full-blooded in this sense appears necessary to 
the practical import of moral practice. An agent who accepted that, all told, actions 
were never right or wrong, would be relectant to engage in personal sacrifice for the 
sake of morally right action (see Lillehammer 2004 p.101). Likewise, an agent who 
accepted that, at base, moral judgements could never be in error, would be disinclined 
to engage in moral argument with others where that argument has no obvious personal 
benefit. In general, moral agents would not see their behaviours influenced by 
morality in the pragmatically important ways they are if their adherence to the 
assumptions of moral practice were not full-blooded. In so far as any error-theoretic 
vindication of assumtions cannot preserve full-bloodedness, it is to that extent 
revisionary. What is needed to resist the second stage of the presumptive is a full-
blooded antirealist vindication of the relevant assumptions.  
 
5. Two Further Errors 
 
So far we have not seen any reason to doubt the force of presumptive arguments that 
employ at least some of features listed in §1(a). Against Loeb, the ubiquity and 
practical import of moral practice shows that these features require vindication. 
Against error-theorists such as Joyce, the full-bloodedness of some of these features 
rules out error-theoretic vindications of them. Yet it still doesn‘t follow that the 
presumptive arguments that make reference to these features are successful, because 
there are two further mistakes that such arguments may make.  
The first is thinking that the face value of moral practice is metaethically 
loaded, and in the realists favor. This begins as an error in the first stage of 
presumptive arguments, for it mistakes the content of the face-value of moral practice. 
More precisely the mistake is to suppose that realism itself, or some of its distinctive 
‗The Pretensions of Moral Realism‘ Neil Sinclair 
12 
 
claims, are among the features of moral practice that require vindication. I shall argue 
that actual moral practice doesn‘t involve any explicit metaethical commitments – 
realist or otherwise – and that even if it did it wouldn‘t follow that these commitments 
were in need of vindication.  
Avoiding the first error, realists might claim that though the (pragmatically 
important) features of moral practice are in themselves metaethically neutral, they 
could only be vindicated were realism to be true. This line of argument presupposes a 
claim about the power of antirealists to vindicate the pragmatically important features 
of moral practice and as such is vulnerable to a second error: underestimating the 
vindicating resources available to antirealists. This is an error in the second stage of 
presumptive arguments. I shall argue that once the first error is avoided the features 
that remain in need of vindication are features for which antirealists can provide 
plausible vindications or, at least, that this is so for all of the features listed in §1(a).  
In the next two sections I elaborate on these criticisms, giving examples of 
each mistake from the recent literature.  
 
6. First Error: Realism Part of the Face-value  
 
If those who engage in moral practice experience morality as sensitivity to moral 
properties such as the realist posits, then realism is an experiential form of moral 
practice. Similarly, if those who engage in moral practice are disposed to assent to 
moral realism (or some of its distinctive claims) when questioned about their 
understanding of their practice, then realism is an explicit assumption of moral 
practice. Finally, if one of the linguistic forms of moral practice is that of being fact-
stating (in the realist sense) then realism is a linguistic form of moral practice. If we 
suppose that such appearances, assumptions and forms require non-error-theoretic 
vindication then it follows that only realism can vindicate the pragmatically important 
features moral practice. The face-value of moral practice would be explicitly 
metaethically loaded in favor of realism.  
But antirealists can and should resist these claims. First, because it is 
implausible to think that realism – or indeed any metaethical theory – is an explicit 
experiential content, assumption or form of ordinary moral practice. Second because 
even if this did turn out to be the case, it wouldn‘t follow that these features are 
pragmatically important (and thus in need of vindication). I take these points in turn. 




The first point can be most easily made with respect to the experiential forms 
of moral practice. As Kirchin (2003 pp.249-51) argues, the claims of moral realism do 
not seem to be part of the content of moral experience. The starting point of our 
everyday moral experience is a moral response to situations the experience of which 
can be non-morally described: we respond with moral disapproval to an act of 
deliberate infliction of pain, with moral disquiet to an unequal distribution of 
resources or with moral approval to an agent who puts helping others before helping 
himself. In these confrontations with the world, moral properties themselves do not 
feature as elements in our experience. As Kirchin (2003 p.250) puts it: ‗Do we really 
have a raw experience of ethical values as being mind-independent, as being a certain 
metaphysical [realist] way? Surely, instead, this idea enters our mind after we have 
reflected on our and other‘s ethical responses‘.6 Furthermore, although our moral 
responses are themselves experienced as constrained by the features of the world – so 
for example, we may feel that moral disapproval is mandated by the deliberate 
infliction of pain, that the world itself, and not ourselves, make this response 
appropriate – this is perfectly compatible with those responses being ultimately 
affective rather than cognitive. As Blackburn (1993 pp.154-5) has pointed out, it is 
common for those in the grip of a particular pattern of concern to experience various 
features of the world as constraining their responses. For example, a love-struck 
individual will see the pain of her bethrothed as mandating her assisstance. To hold 
further that the phenomenology of moral responses reflects not just this worldliness 
but also a particular – realist – explanation of it is to attribute an unrealistic degree of 
conceptual sophistication to immediate moral experience.
7
  
This point concerning arguments from moral experience easily generalizes to 
those concerning the assumptions and linguistic forms of moral practice.  
Regarding assumptions, it is unlikely that moral realism (or any of its 
distinctive claims) is an explicit assumption of everyday moralizers. Everyday 
moralizers seldom show appreciation of metaethical issues and categories, let alone 
                                                 
6
 See also Hume‘s Treatise 3.1.1.25: ‗Take any action allowed to be vicious: Wilful murder, for 
instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which 
you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and 
thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you 
consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a 
sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action.’ 
7
 See McDowell 1985 (footnote 4) for an example of this error. 
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appreciation of a particular metaethical theory. The categories that define metaethical 
theories are to a large extent philosopher‘s constructs rather than tacit categories of 
everyday moralizers. This is not to denigrate the complexities of first-order moral 
thought. Everyday moralizers hold that some things are right, others wrong, that some 
moral judgments are true, that there are correct answers to moral questions, that moral 
disagreement is possible, that moral claims can be supported by reasons and so on. 
But these are not categories that define realism. What defines realism is the view that 
moral judgments have a characteristic linguistic function, express states of mind with 
a characteristic representational function and (therefore) that their truth consists in 
correspondence between the representational content of such states and the moral way 
of the world. These are sophisticated philosophical claims, involving, for example, an 
appreciation of the distinctions between representational and non-representational 
linguistic and psychological functions and between truth understood as accurate 
representation and truth understood in other terms. It is one thing to claim that 
everyday moralizers assume moral judgments to be true, quite another to claim that 
they assume moral truth to be understood as the realist sees it. Ask the woman on the 
Clapham omnibus whether recreational torture is wrong and she may well reply that it 
is. But ask whether her judgment that torture is wrong is representative of moral 
reality, or made true by correspondence between the representational content of the 
mental state her judgment expresses and the distinctively moral state of the world and 
one is more likely to be faced with an uncomprehending silence. Of course, she may 
take it that to say that ‗The judgment that recreational torture is wrong represents 
moral reality‘ is to say no more than the original ‗Recreational torture is wrong‘. But 
in that case this is not to offer any metaethical claim, rather just to repeat the original 
assertion in a different (perhaps more emphatic) idiom.  
A recent trend in ‗experimental‘ metaethics provides a possible objection to 
this line of thought. This research program involves experimental situations designed 
to elicit metaethical responses from moral agents untutored in metaethical literature. 
Goodwin and Darley (2008), for example, seek to determine to what extent everyday 
moralizers are committed to the possibility of a type of moral disagreement where the 
dissenting party is regarded as being mistaken. The experimental results thus secured 
are important to an informed understanding of our actual moral practices, but their 
metaethical import is limited. In particular, Goodwin and Darley assume that 
recognizing such disagreement is ‗one of the hallmarks of ethical objectivism‘ (2008 
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p.1344), and thus take their experimental results to show that most everyday 
moralizers are ethical objectivists. But though there may be a stipulative, 
platitudinous, sense of ‗objectivism‘ in which those who assume there to be moral 
disagreement of the relevant type are objectivists, this finding doesn‘t speak to the 
metaethical debate between realism and antirealism, since antirealists too can 
accommodate this type of disagreement. For anti-realists, moral disagreement is 
disagreement in attitude, and one will regard the other‘s attitude as mistaken just so 
long as it clashes with an attitude that one reflectively endorses and one has a motive 
to change the others‘ attitude (see, for example, Stevenson 1937, 1944 and 1948). In 
the more usual sense of ‗objectivism‘, according to which it is a version of moral 
realism on which moral properties are constitutively independent of agents‘ 
responses, it is false that assuming the relevant sort of moral disagreement to be 
possible is tantamount to assuming objectivism, since, so defined, non-objectivist 
accounts of such disagreement are available.
8
 In either case the experimental data 
obtained by Goodwin and Darley does not mark out the participants in their trial as 
tacit moral realists. The assumption of disagreement this experiment focuses on is, of 




Note that my reasons for doubting moral realism to be an explicit assumption 
of moral practice employ empirical claims about actual moralizers, just as Kirchin‘s 
rebuttal of the phenomenological argument relies on empirical claims about (his own) 
moral experience. Yet insofar as realists rely on such claims in offering presumptive 
arguments, the burden here lies with the realist to support the empirical claims her 
argument requires. This is why the methodology of experimental metaethics to be 
welcomed. But even given this admirable attempt to ground the realist case, the 
presumptive argument fails because the empirical evidence does not support the claim 
that moral realism (as opposed to moral objectivism in the platitudinous sense) is an 
assumption of moral practice. Nor will it advance the realist case to point out that 
some people (philosophy professors, perhaps) make the assumption of realism when 
engaging in moral practice (see, for example, Cuneo 2006). For it is equally true that 
                                                 
8
 For this sense of objectivism, see Sayre-McCord 1988 and Shafer-Landau 2003. 
9
 A similar point applies to the interpretation of the experiments performed by Nichols and Folds-
Bennett (2003). In this case, the authors equate acceptance of the response-independence of moral 
attributions with acceptance of moral objectivism. Since antirealists can vindicate the response-
independence of moral attributions (see Blackburn 1984), this empirical discovery is theoretically 
important but metatheoretically neutral.  
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some people (other philosophy professors, perhaps) make antirealist assumptions 
when moralizing and it begs the question against antirealism to assume that the realist 
assumptions must be vindicated at the expense of the antirealist ones.  
 
There is, however, a more serious problem with presumptive arguments at in 
this area. This is because even if it should turn out, after empirical investigation, that 
realism is an assumption made by some, most, or even all actual moralizers, it 
wouldn‘t follow that it was also a pragmatically important one. That is, even granting 
that realism is itself part of the face-value of moral practice, and that only realism can 
vindicate this face value, it doesn‘t follow that this particular part of the face value 
stand in need of vindication. So long as it was possible for agents to engage in a 
parallel practice, shorn of the assumption of realism, and in doing so still relate to 
each other and the world in the important ways made possible by moral practice, then 
the realist assumption would not be pragmatically important, despite its ubiquity. 
Furthermore, such a parallel practice does seem to be a genuine possibility.  
To see this, consider the following scenario. On the planet Golgafrincham all 
of those who engage in moral practice assume the truth of moral realism. That is, they 
are disposed to assent to moral realism when questioned regarding their understanding 
of their moral practice (or perhaps, disposed to assent after teaching and reflection). 
On colonizing nearby Lamuella the Golgafrincham's encounter another species who 
also engage in moral practice and yet do not assume realism while doing so. The 
Lamuellans engage in a practice with all of the features mentioned in §1(a): they 
apply moral predicates, they assume that some things are right, others wrong, that 
some moral judgments are true, that there are correct answers to moral questions, that 
moral disagreement is possible, that moral claims can be supported by reasons and so 
on. What Lamuellans lack is any disposition to assent to moral realism (even after 
tutoring). After colonization the two races henceforth engage in moral disputes, 
relating to each other and the world in the ways only made accessible by morality: 
they dispute the rightness and wrongness of certain courses of actions, discourse 
about the good life, negotiate moral frameworks within which to frame the laws of 
their society and so on (all the while assuming that some things are right, others 
wrong, that some moral judgments are true, that there are correct answers to moral 
questions, that moral disagreement is possible and so on). The fact that the Lumellans, 
who make no assumption of realism, can thus engage in important moral dispute with 
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the Golgafrinchams proves that the assumption of moral realism is not a pragmatically 
important part of moral practice.
10
 What is important for the pragmatic benefits of 
moral practice is to assume that some things are right, others wrong, that some moral 
judgments are true, that there are correct answers to moral questions, that moral 
disagreement is possible, that moral claims can be supported by reasons and so on. It 
is not important that one assume any particular – for example, realist – vindicatory 
story of these claims.
 11
  
Hence even if moral realism were itself a universally held assumption of 
actual moralizers, it wouldn‘t follow that it is pragmatically important, that is, in need 
of vindication. (To suppose otherwise is a mistake at the third stage of presumptive 
arguments.)  This objection places an even more onerous burden of proof on the 
realist. It is not enough to show (what has yet to be shown) that ordinary moralizers 
assume the truth of moral realism. To establish a presumption, realists need to show 
that only a practice that makes such an assumption can help us relate to the world and 
to each other in the ways allowed for by moral practice. As the example above 
demonstrates, it is unlikely that this can be done.    
 
At this stage the realist may prefer to claim that their theory (or some of its 
distinctive claims) is a pragmatically important linguistic form of moral practice, 
rather than a form of moral experience or an assumption of that practice. For example, 
realists often claim the moral practice has ‗fact-stating form‘, the form of a practice 
that makes reference to moral properties, or simply ‗realist form‘ (see, for example, 
Brink 1989 pp.25-7 and Shafer-Landau 2003 p.23). Unfortunately it is unclear what to 
make of such claims. To say that a practice has fact-stating form could mean no more 
than that it involves uttering indicative sentences, where a predicate is applied to a 
subject, and that there are some interpersonally agreed standards for applying such 
predicates. To say that a practice makes reference to properties could mean no more 
than to say that it involves such predication. These are indeed genuine forms of moral 
                                                 
10
 Generalizing, the thought is that agents with differing meta-ethical views, even those with no meta-
ethical views, can be involved in pragmatically important moral agreement and disagreement. Thus 
Lenman (2007 p.74): ‗Think of the most clear-cut and obviously appalling instances of such crimes as 
murder, torture or rape. Now of course we all think it‘s just a no-brainer that behaviour like this is 
wrong…What sort of thought is this?...I don‘t think it‘s the thought that this behaviour has some sort of 
non-natural property because I don‘t think there are any natural properties…I don‘t think that you 
would need to agree with me about that rather rarefied metaphysical claim to agree with me that this 
sort of behaviour is morally wrong.‘   
11
 See Blackburn 1993 pp.150-1 for the same conclusion.  
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practice, but they are not realist forms, since standard-governed predication can be 
understood in non-realist ways (see Blackburn 1984, 1998, Gibbard 1990, 2003 and 
Lenman 2003). On the other hand, it is difficult to see what else realists might mean 
by saying that moral practice has fact-stating form, or what it might add to say that the 
practice itself has ‗realist‘ form. They may mean that realism is an explicit assumption 
of actual moralizers, in which case the objections given above apply. They may mean 
that moral practice possesses certain linguistic and argumentative forms that, though 
not explicitly realist, are nevertheless such that they could only be vindicated if 
realism were true. In that case they accept the current point, which is simply that 
realism is not itself an explicit (pragmatically important) feature of moral practice. It 
is unclear what else could be intended by the claim that moral practice has ‗fact-
stating‘ or ‗realist‘ form that would be such as to generate a distinct presumptive 
argument.  
 
6.1. Examples of the First Error 
 
The first error of presumptive arguments then, is to assume realism itself (or some of 
its distinctive claims) to be a pragmatically important form of experience, assumption 
or linguistic form of moral practice. Examples of this error can be found in the work 
many moral realists.  
Finlay (2007), for instance, employs Timmons‘ notational distinction between 
‗facts‘ and ‗FACTS‘, where the latter captures the sense of ‗fact‘ the realist believes 
in and the former defines a weaker, minimalist, sense that is potentially compatible 
with antirealism. In this minimal sense to say it is a to say that it is a fact that 
recreational torture is wrong is to say no more than that recreational torture is wrong. 
Finlay (2007 p.824) goes onto claim that claims that ‗[p]roponents of [realist] 
positions insist that ordinary practice is committed to moral TRUTH that exists even 
from a detached moral perspective, and moral FACTS that come to us straight from 
the WORLD‘. In other words, Finlay claims, ordinary moral practice is not just 
committed to there being moral truth and moral facts, but to a realist understanding of 
truth and factuality. The problem with this claim is that it is implausible to suppose 
that ordinary engagement with moral practice involves such philosophically 
sophisticated commitments. Ordinary moralizers surely assume the existence of moral 
facts in the minimal sense (since this is no more than to assume that some actions are 
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right, others wrong), but less obviously assume the existence of moral FACTS. Ask 
the Clapham omnibus rider whether there are moral FACTS (as opposed to moral 
facts) and one is just as likely to be met with bewilderment as assent. Further, even if 
the omnibus rider would assent to moral FACTS (and that would be an empirical 
matter) it wouldn‘t follow that this assumption of hers was pragmatically important. 
Indeed there is strong reason to think that it would not be, namely the ability of those 
who don‘t make the assumption to engage productively in moral enquiry. Thus there 
is no successful presumptive argument based on alleged the assumption of moral 
FACTS.   
In a similar vein, Shafer-Landau (2003 p.24) writes: 
 
We use indicative mood when issuing moral judgments. We assert that 
practices, character traits, or states are vicious, morally attractive or 
deserving…Moral talk is shot through with description, attribution and 
predication. This makes perfect sense if cognitivism is true. 
 
This passage groups together three putatively distinct notions: description, attribution 
and predication. The latter is purely syntactic and hence metatheoretically neutral. But 
if the other two notions are to add to the argument then we must assume that to say 
that moral talk is descriptive or attributive is to say more than that it involves applying 
predicates to subjects. What more? To say that moral talk is descriptive could be to 
say that moral talk involves the expression of mental states that represent the world in 
moral ways. And to say that moral talk is attributive could be to say that moral talk 
involves attributing moral properties such as the realist posits to actions, states of 
affairs and characters (see, for example, Miller 2003 p.38-9). Both of these claims are 
part of realism. However, when we interpret them this way it becomes controversial 
whether description and attribution really are some of the pragmatically important 
features of moral practice. It is undeniable that moral talk involves moral predication 
and that such a practice is pragmatically important. But to claim that in applying 
moral predicates agents assume a certain metatheoretical understanding of that 
practice is much more controversial, and unsupported by simple observations of 
actual agents applying moral predicates. The empirically uncontroversial phenomenon 
here is the metatheoretically neutral one of moral predication, with it being a further 
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issue how that predication is to be understood.
12
 Realism and expressivism give two 
competing explanations, but neither is explicitly assumed by the practice.  
 Further, even if most everyday moralizers did assume that their moral 
predication is descriptive and attributive, it wouldn‘t follow that these assumptions are 
pragmatically important (and so in need of vindication). For as long as there is a 
parallel pragmatically equivalent practice available that doesn‘t involve these 
assumptions, nothing of distinctive import would be lost by engaging in this practice. 
An expressivist practice, for example, can preserve standard-governed moral 
predication (see Blackburn 1984 pp.189-96). Hence the mere fact that moral discourse 
takes subject-predicate form (and even if this form is understood descriptively and 
attributively) doesn‘t generate a presumptive argument for realism. 
 
 A final, more subtle yet significant manifestation of the first error can be 
found in the following passage from McNaughton. Criticizing Blackburn‘s 
construction of moral truth for expressivists, McNaughton expounds Blackburn‘s 
position as explaining how, from within the practice of forming and regimenting our 
moral attitudes, it makes sense to suppose that there is a singularly best set of such 
attitudes and thus from within that practice we can make sense of the notion of a 
correct moral opinion as an opinion expressing an attitude that belongs within that set. 
McNaughton (1988 p.188) responds: 
 
It is difficult to resist the conclusion that, although we talk and think 
within our moral practice as if there were correct answers to moral 
questions, Blackburn‘s theory can make no sense, from the external 
standpoint, of the notion of a correct moral answer. 
 
McNaughton‘s point may generalize to a criticism of the antirealist vindication of 
moral facts and moral truth: it may be, for all the antirealist says, that we can talk 
within moral practice as if there were moral truths and moral facts (such as the fact 
that recreational torture is wrong), but the same story cannot make any sense, from the 
external standpoint, of such facts or truths. Unfortunately for realists, this argument 
fails. It may be that Blackburn‘s theory cannot provide an account of a correct moral 
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answer from an external standpoint – that is, from a point of view disengaged from 
moral action, argument and thought – but McNaughton provides no reason to think 
that moral practice is committed not just to the existence of correct moral answers, but 
to correctness that can be understood from an external, non-moral, standpoint. 
Further, it may be that Blackburn‘s theory cannot provide an account of moral facts or 
moral truths that are understandable from the detached perspective, but again 
McNaughton provides no reason to think that moral practice is committed not just to 
the existence of moral truths and facts, but to moral facts and truths can be understood 
from a perspective outside of engagement with moral issues. Moral practice is 
uncontroversially committed to the idea that some moral opinions are correct, others 
incorrect, and hence to moral facts and moral truths in a minimal sense. Further, if 
Blackburn‘s account succeeds (which McNaughton doesn‘t dispute) we can explain 
why those engaged in moral practice remain committed to these ideas. But it is a 
further claim entirely (and an empirically unsubstantiated one) that the pragmatically 
important assumptions of moral practice include the assumptions that these notions of 
correctness, fact and truth are understandable from a perspective outside of 
engagement in moral issues. This is to unjustifiably read realist metatheory into the 
assumptions of moral practice that require vindication.  
 
6.2. Diagnosis of the First Error 
 
If it is indeed an error to read into the pragmatically important features of moral 
practice some of the distinctive claims of realism, it may help to diagnose possible 
sources. One such is a potential ambiguity in the terms of the debate. Many terms 
deployed in metaethics can be interpreted in one way to describe metatheoreteically 
innocuous features of moral discourse and in another to describe a specific 
commitments of moral realism. For example, consider the claim: ‗There are moral 
facts‘. This can be read in two ways. First, to claim that there are moral facts may be 
to claim that it is sometimes appropriate to sincerely utter moral sentences such as 
‗Recreational torture is wrong‘. This is the minimal, metatheoretically innocuous 
sense of fact, mentioned previously, according to which talk of facts fails to raise any 
nonmoral, metatheoretical, stakes (see Blackburn 1998 p.295). Second, to claim that 
there are moral facts may be to claim that there are moral states of affairs such as the 
realist posits. It is uncontroversial that one of the pragmatically important assumptions 
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of moral practice is that there are moral facts in the former sense. But it is not 
uncontroversial that one of the pragmatically important assumptions of moral practice 
is that there are moral facts in the latter sense. Ordinary moralizers are obviously 
committed to the appropriateness of some moral utterances, but less obviously 
committed to a realistic construal of those utterances.
13
  
Such ambiguity can be pernicious. Consider the following argument.  
 
According to expressivists there are no moral facts. But one of the most 
pragmatically important assumptions of moral practice is that there are 
moral facts. For example, it is a fact recreational torture is wrong. 
Therefore, expressivists cannot vindicate this assumption of moral 
practice: their view is necessarily revisionary.  
 
The premises of this argument are true, but it is not valid because it trades on 
ambiguity. The sense in which expressivists deny the existence of moral facts is not 
the sense in which moral practice assumes there to be such facts.  
Though this argument is a parody, several realists come close to offering it. 
Brink (1989 p.29) argues that ‗commonsense moral thinking…supports moral realism 
in so far as we act as if there are moral facts‘. Shafer-Landau (2003 p.25) claims that 
‗according to non-cognitivism, there are no moral facts or truths‘. He equates this 
with the view that according to non-cognitivism, it is never appropriate to sincerely 
utter declarative moral sentences (non-cogntivists, Shafer-Landau claims, ‗don‘t 
believe in virtue‘). In response, non-cogntivists can claim that they do hold that there 
are things we should do and that certain characters are virtuous. What they deny is the 
realist account of such claims. To claim, as these realists appear to, that moral 
discourse assumes not only that certain actions should be done and that certain 
characters are virtuous, but also a realistic construal of such claims, is to overestimate 
the pragmatically important assumptions of ordinary moralizers.  
A similar strategy can be applied to other terms that supposedly define moral 
realism, such as ‗belief‘ or ‗mind-independence‘, for it can be argued that the sense in 
which ordinary moral practice admits there to be moral beliefs, or admits morality to 
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be mind-independent, is not the sense in which expressivists deny that there are such 
beliefs, or that morality is mind-independent (see Sinclair 2008). In each instance, the 
key is recognizing that moral discourse employs only a minimal (that is, metaethically 
neutral) sense of the disputed notion. In the case of belief, for example, we can 
recognize a useful role for this term in raising and discussing issues of sincerity (‗Do 
you really believe that?‘), in expressing uncertain authority for one‘s commitment (‗I 
believe that abortion is objectionable, but maybe that‘s just me.‘) and, more generally 
in keeping track of commitments that can feature in inferences (see Ridge 2006b). 
These roles – important to those engaged in the moral practice – define a minimal 
sense of belief that has a useful function for participants of the practice but which 
doesn‘t impinge on metaethical issues. The plausible pragmatically important 
assumption in this area is only that moral judgments are beliefs in this minimal sense. 
Likewise, in the case of mind-independence, it can be argued that all ordinary 
engagement in moral practice commits one to is the thought that the application-
conditions for moral predicates are not such that those predicates are correctly applied 
just when we are the judger possesses a certain attitude. This is a metaethically neutral 
assumption regarding the application-conditions for moral predicates, not a 
metaethically loaded one regarding the vindicatory story behind those conditions. 
(Nor does either of these moves entail that the terms of the metaethical debate are 
lost: the point is only that ordinary engagement in moral practice takes no stand on the 
metaethical issues.) 
Finally, it is worth considering in this context a popular, if loose, claim often 
made by realists. This is the claim that, according to antirealism, nothing is right and 
wrong, at least not really (see, for example, Shafer-Landau 2003 pp.14, 27 and 55). 
With the qualification removed, this claim is false, so what can the ‗really‘ be adding? 
It could be intimating that, within the context of forming moral opinions, antirealists 
can never be whole-heartedly committed in the moral stances they adopt. This is also 
false. For antirealists of the expressivist type, to adopt a moral stance is to adopt a 
moral attitude, and although there may be some occasions where anemic attitudes are 
appropriate, there are just as obviously other cases where taking a certain stance, and 
being guided by that stance in all contexts, is absolutely the thing to do (see 
Blackburn 1993 p.157). The expression of such stances will result in judgments of 
rightness and wrongness that are whole-hearted (that is, accepted in all contexts of 
moral reflection). Alternatively, the ‗really‘ in the disputed claim could be understood 
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as averting us to realist metaphysics, as claiming that according to antirealism, there 
are no moral facts such as the realist believes in. This is true, but as an argument for 
moral realism, it is too quick. In order for such an argument to avoid being obviously 
question-begging the tacit assumption must be that ordinary engagement with moral 
discourse carries with it commitment moral facts in the realist sense (that is, to moral 
FACTS). But we have seen good reason to think that this sort of commitment is not a 
pragmatically important part of moral practice. To assume that it is mistakes the 
pragmatically important face-value of moral practice.  
 
A second potential source of the error of reading too much metaethics into the 
face-value of moral practice may be the thought that antirealism is by definition a 
revisionary theory (see, for example, Brink 1989 p.19 and Dworkin 1996). This 
thought is easily acquired if introduced to antirealism through the work of A.J. Ayer, 
who defined his version of antirealism in terms of its denial of truth-aptness to moral 
sentences – a denial at obvious odds with common practice. Subsequent antirealists, at 
least of an expressivist variety, disagreed by arguing that attributing an expressive 
function to moral language does not necessitate denying truth-aptness to the resulting 
judgments (see, for example, Stevenson 1963 p.215). But in certain quarters the 
reputation of antirealism was permanently tarnished, and expressivism in particular 
became a view which by definition seeks to revise at least some of the ordinary 
assumptions of moral discourse (if not, perhaps, the assumption of truth-aptness). If 
this characterization of expressivism is correct, then no matter how far the 
expressivist vindication progresses, there must always be some features of moral 
practice beyond their reach. These features, whatever they are, will be the distinctive 
commitment of realism and part of the face-value of moral practice, giving the realist 
a natural presumptive case against expressivism. The problem with this line of 
thought is that expressivism is not best characterized as necessarily revisionary. It is 
best characterized as a view about the distinctive function of moral discourse, a claim 
that was embryonic in Ayer‘s work and that leaves open the question of whether or 
not a practice which serves that function could develop the pragmatically important 
face-value possessed by actual moral practice. Similarly, realism is not best 
characterized in terms of the features of moral practice such as truth-aptness. Realists 
consider themselves to be offering a particular semantic, psychological and 
metaphysical understanding of the features of moral practice (such as their 
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understanding of truth-aptness in terms of representation and accuracy) and not just a 
renumeration of them. Once this way of understanding metaethical theories is 
accepted, it is harder to suppose that the debate is one on which the face-value of 
moral discourse takes a determinate position.  
 
7. Second Error: Underestimating Antirealist Resources 
 
According to the argument so far the pragmatically important experiential forms, 
linguistic features and assumptions of moral practice are metaethically neutral in the 
sense that they do not involve of any of the distinctive claims of realism. Realism 
itself is not part of the (pragmatically important) face-value of moral practice.  
If that were the whole of the case against presumptive arguments, realists 
might rightly object that their position has been misrepresented. For what they 
intended to claim, they might protest, is not that realism itself is part of the 
pragmatically important face-value of moral practice, but that those who engage in 
moral practice adopt certain positions and exhibit certain linguistic, discursive or 
inferential tendencies that could only be vindicated if moral realism is true. On this 
view, realism itself is not an apparent feature or appearance of our moral practice, 
rather the features of our moral practice are apparently realist insofar as it looks as if 
they can only be vindicated if realism is true.  
Some realists are explicit about offering this form of argument. Brink (1989 
p.25) writes: 
 
I do not claim that moral realism is a common belief…my concern is with 
the philosophical implications or presuppositions of moral thought and 
practice. I claim that cognitivism seems to be presupposed by common 
practices of moral judgment, argument and deliberation. (Contrast Shafer-
Landau 2003 p.18.)  
 
But though such arguments avoid the error of falsifying the pragmtically important 
face-value of moral practice, they are prone to a second error. One is justified in 
claiming that only realism can vindicate the pragmtically important features of moral 
practice just in case it can be shown that no other metaethical theory can vindicate 
those features. Thus this sort of presumptive argument requires a general claim about 
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the options available to the other metaethical theories in vindicating the features of 
moral practice that stand in need of vindication. It is in making such a claim the 
realists typically make the second error of presumptive arguments. This is the error of 
underestimating the resources available to antirealists – and in particular expressivists 
– by reference to which the vindication can proceed.  
 
When it comes to establishing a presumption against expressivism, the core of 
this error derives from systematically downplaying certain parts of the expressivist 
theory. It is common, for example, to understand expressivism as committed to 
simply two claims: the negative claim that moral judgments do not express moral 
beliefs and the positive claim that moral judgments express affective attitudes.
14
 This 
characterisation ignores the expressivist picture of the purpose or function of this 
expression. At least since Stevenson, expressivists have held that we can only 
properly understand the meaning of moral judgments when we have understood not 
only the state of mind they express, but also the function of that expression, in 
particular the distinctive persuasive role of moral judgments. For expressivists, moral 
judgments are not mere ‗sounding off‘; they do not simply display one‘s attitudes as 
one‘s choice of football shirt displays one‘s sporting allegiance. Rather, when we 
express our moral attitudes we do so with the intention of getting others to share them. 
Moral judgments are ‗instruments used in the complicated interplay and re-adjustment 
of human interests‘ (Stevenson 1944 p.13). For expressivists moral discourse is just 
one part of a wider practice of interpersonal attitudinal regulation. Most generally, the 
mutual influencing of attitudes takes place via the medium of sanctioning and 
encouraging behaviors. The behavioral dispositions involved in such regulation are 
diverse bunch, ranging from simple avoidance to taking social and legal action to 
curtail other‘s behavior. Some of these patterns of action are rather inefficient ways of 
changing attitudes. For example, it may take some time for someone to notice that you 
are shunning them, even longer for them to work out precisely why and longer still to 
pursue legal action against them. What is useful, therefore, is a way of expressing 
one‘s preparedness to engage in this sort of encouraging and sanctioning behavior 
without actually doing so. This is what moral discourse does, according to 
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 See, for example, Brink 1989 p.19,  Shafer-Landau 2003 p.18 and Sinnott-Armstrong 2006 p.18. The 
label ‗non-cognitivism‘ exacerbates this tendency, which may explain why few expressivists accept it. 
Blackburn (1998 p.77) prefers to call his view ‗practical functionalism‘.  
‗The Pretensions of Moral Realism‘ Neil Sinclair 
27 
 
expressivists. By judging that recreational torture is wrong, for example, I express a 
willingness to impose these sorts of sanctions on those who fail to share my 
disapproval of torture. This threat of sanctions can itself have a sanctioning effect 
(likewise for indications of encouragement). Moral discussion, therefore, acts as a 
demilitarized zone where agents can discuss adjustments in attitude without resorting 
to the military options of physical or legal sanction. For agents with an incentive to 
get along, moral discussion is a pragmatically useful option.  
This placing of moral judgments as instruments in the practice of co-
ordination of attitude provides many of the materials with which expressivists 
vindicate the pragmatically important features of moral practice. Consequently, 
underplaying the practical role of moral judgments can lead some realists to 
erroneously conclude that only they can provide the requisite vindications. In what 
follows I give three examples of how emphasizing the practical role can aid the 
expressivist vindications.  
 
7.1. Examples of the Second Error 
 
Three pragmatically important assumptions of moral practice are that moral 
disagreements are possible, that moral discussion is sometimes a fruitful way of 
resolving and that reasons can be offered in favor of and against moral claims. These 
are assumptions of moral practice not in the sense that agents are disposed to assent 
such claims, or disposed to assent after tutoring (though they may be) but in the sense 
that the behavior of agents that engage in moral practice only make sense if these 
assumptions are true. For a presumptive argument based on these assumptions to 
succeed realists need to support the claim that only they can vindicate them. This in 
turn relies on a claim regarding the resources available to antirealists in achieving the 
same task. So how might the respective vindications proceed?  
Moral realists vindicate the assumptions as follows: moral disagreement 
occurs when one party offers a description of the state of a certain part of the world; 
another party offers a different description; both descriptions cannot be accurate; so 
neither can accept the other‘s commitment. In so far as both have an interest in 
providing correct descriptions of the world, both have a motive for changing the 
opinion of the other. Further, moral discussion is sometimes a fruitful way of 
resolving such disputes because such discussion can help us alert others to features of 
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the situation that they may have missed, thus providing them with an opportunity to 
reassess their description of how things are, morally speaking. Finally, the realist 
picture can explain the practice of providing reasons in favor of moral claims: these 
are reasons for thinking moral reality to be a certain way. In so far as moral disputants 
are concerned to provide an accurate description of this reality, such considerations 
will be salient to their project.  
For expressivists moral disagreement can seem more ephemeral: what can 
moralizers be disagreeing about, if it isn‘t the (moral) state of the world? The answer, 
of course, is that moral disagreement is practical disagreement that occurs when 
agents ‗have opposed attitudes to the same object – one approving of it, for instance, 
and the other disapproving of it – and when at least one of them has a motive for 
altering or calling into question the attitude of the other‘ (Stevenson 1944 p.3).15 So 
whereas disagreement in descriptive matters is born from a concern to change each 
other‘s beliefs, disagreement in morals is borne from a concern to change each other‘s 
attitudes. So long as there is a motive to insist on change there is a disagreement.
16
  
What of the role of moral discussion and the practice of giving reasons? Given 
the above account of moral disagreement as resting on a motive for altering attitudes, 
reasons in support of a moral claim will be reasons in support of taking the particular 
attitude towards the object of evaluation that the moral claim recommends (or insists 
on). Likewise, reasons against a particular moral claim will be reasons against taking 
the particular attitude towards the object of evaluation that the claim recommends (or 
insists on). A reason in support of or against an attitude typically involves citing a 
putative feature of the object to which that attitude is a response. Reasons in support 
of (or against) attitudes will, therefore, typically consist of descriptive claims about 
the nature of the object being evaluated. The aim in making such claims is to change 
other‘s attitudes to the object of evaluation by changing their beliefs on which those 
attitudes are based. In so far as our attitudes can be altered by changes in our beliefs 
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 In Blackburn‘s (1998 p.69) terms, moral disagreements are disagreements ‗in our house‘. 
16
 Opponents might argue that an adequate account of moral disagreement needs also to accommodate 
the sense in which intuitively opposed moral sentences, such as ‗Abortion is wrong‘ and ‗It is not the 
case that abortion is wrong‘ are logically inconsistent, and that the Stevensonian account offered here 
fails to do this. This is to urge an instance of the Frege-Geach problem, as applied to negation (see, for 
example, Schroeder 2008). Fortunately, this problem is not insurmountable, and can be solved in part 
by employing the basic Stevensonian tools mentioned here: see Sinclair 2011. 
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By emphasizing this role the expressivist can therefore vindicate our everyday 
assumptions concerning moral argument and reason-giving and thus undermine 
presumptive arguments that employ such assumptions. These presumptive arguments 
fail because it is false that only realists can vindicate the assumptions in question. 
Although none of these above expressivist vindications are original, they are 
instructive in so far as they show what the expressivist can achieve once she 
emphasizes the practical co-ordinating role of moral discourse.  
None of the features of moral practice listed in §1(a) are without an attempted 
expressivist vindication and many of these rely on emphasizing the practical 
coordinating role of moral practice. For example, within the context of forming 
attitudes for the purposes of mutual co-ordination, it makes sense to have an interest 
in the implications of one‘s attitudes, in clashes of attitude, in how one‘s set of 
attitudes might be improved and in the implications of the attitudes one has. These 
concerns provide the material for a vindicatory story of the subject-predicate form of 
moral sentences and their embedding in standard inference patterns (see Blackburn 
1984 pp.189-96, 1988b, 1998 pp.68-77, 2002 and Gibbard 2003). Other examples of 
expressivist vindications relying on a practical coordinating function are the 
vindication of mind-independence (see Sinclair 2008), fallibility and the possibility of 
moral knowledge (see Blackburn 1980 and 1981). It is impossible to assess all these 
attempted vindications here, but fortunately for the expressivist who opposes 
presumptive arguments it is also not necessary. It is the realist who must support their 
claim that these expressivist vindications cannot succeed. The present point is just 
that given the resources open to expressivists once they emphasize the practical 
coordinating role of moral practice, this claim is best premature.  
The first mistake of presumptive arguments – reading the claims of realism 
into pragmatically important features of moral practice – is also relevant here. Many 
realists publicly doubt the breadth of resources available to expressivism when 
vindicating the face-value of moral discourse. Many of these suppose further that they 
can present presumptive arguments of the sort under consideration without discussing 
in detail the proposed expressivist vindications (see, for example, Brink 1989 pp.14-
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See Stevenson 1950, 1962 and Blackburn 1988a. There is no guarantee that a given agent‘s attitudes 
will be responsive to the features cited, but this reflects the reality of moral discussion.  
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36 and Shafer-Landau 2003 p.13-38). This would be a reasonable strategy if the 
features in question themselves embodied some of the claims of realism, for then we 
could know in advance that no expressivist vindication of these features could be 
complete (only realism can vindicate, in a non-error-theoretic way, an explicit 
assumption of realism). But, as I have argued above, there is no reason to think that 
the pragmatically important face-value of moral practice is explicitly realist in this 
way. It is therefore unreasonable to assume the failure of expressivist vindications in 
advance of detailed consideration of expressivists‘ efforts. This point, together with a 
proper appreciation for the resources available to expressivists, provides general 
reason to be skeptical of the second stage of presumptive arguments.  
 
In light of this, realists face what may be called Kirchin‘s dilemma, since it 
generalizes a point Kirchin (2003 p.257) makes about phenomenological arguments. 
Either proponents of presumptive arguments describe the pragmatically important 
face-value of moral practice in explicitly realist terms, in which case they 
misrepresent that face-value or its pragmatic importance. Or they describe it in 
metaethically neutral terms, in which case they cannot justify their sweeping 
assumption that all possible expressivist vindications of this face-value fail, especially 
in the light of a proper understanding of available antirealist strategies. It is an 
worthshile task to consider how may extant presumptive arguments avoid both horns 
of this dilemma.   
 
8. Weak Presumptive Arguments 
 
Some realists might accept the foregoing and concede that antirealists, or at least 
expressivists, can vindicate all of the pragmatically important features of moral 
practice. Yet these realists may hold that it remains the case that these vindications are 
unnatural, uneasy or unnecessarily complex. This is to offer a weak presumptive 
argument for moral realism. Both Brink and Shafer-Landau seem to offer such 
arguments. But what is it that realists intend to assert when they assert that the 
antirealist vindication of the face-value of moral practice is unnatural? In this section 
I consider three possible interpretations of this claim, none of which generates the 
desired presumption.  
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First, the claim may be that although antirealists, or at least expressivists, can 
vindicate the linguistic and discursive forms of moral practice, they cannot vindicate 
the assumptions about those forms. For example, realists might hold that moral 
practice allows application of the truth predicate (linguistic form) and assumes that 
that predication is the attribution of a robust property of correspondence between the 
representational content of the judgement and the state of the world (assumption about 
the form). Consistent with this, antirealists may give an account of the application of 
the truth predicate in moral contexts, but this account would be unnatural in so far as 
it fails to vindicate the common assumption of that this predication is genuinely 
attributive of the realist property of truth. On this view, to say that the antirealist 
vindication is unnatural is to say that it is incomplete: it vindicates the forms but not 
the assumptions of moral practice. This sort of weak presumptive argument is really a 
strong presumptive argument in disguise, since it claims that there are some 
assumptions of moral practice (assumptions about its linguistic forms) that cannot be 
vindicated by antirealists because they are explicitly realist. This leaves such 
arguments vulnerable to the first mistake I have outlined above: that of taking realism 
itself to be a pragmatically important feature of moral practice. In this case, there is no 
reason to think that the assumption regarding the nature of the truth-predicate is a 
pragmatically important part of the practice.  
 
Second, the claim may be that antirealist vindication of the features of moral 
practice is unnatural in so far as it is counter to the vindicatory story that most people 
are inclined to believe, or the story that most people are tempted to adopt when they 
engage in metaethical reflection. On this view, although the features of moral practice 
are not in any way explicitly metatheoretical, it is a fact that when people come to 
consider metaethical questions they most readily or naturally accept the realist answer 
to those questions. For example, one metaethical question is how we are to understand 
the notion of truth as employed by moral practice. Realists offering the sort of 
argument being considered here would claim that the realist understanding of truth – 
roughly, as accuracy of representation – is the view of truth that we most naturally 
come to when considering this question. Another common example of this argument 
concerns logical relations such as consistency and validity. Realists may hold that 
although expressivists can provide an account of these relations as they hold between 
moral judgments, it is not the most natural, philosophical scheme of understanding 
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such relations (see Shafer-Landau 2003 p.18). Thus even if expressivism is not 
revisionary of our actual moral practice, it is revisionary of our most readily adopted 
theories of phenomena such as truth-talk and logical argument. 
This is a much more interesting interpretation of weak presumptive arguments, 
but it also exposes the weakness in the realist position. Those who adopt this line 
accept that expressivists can vindicate all of the features of moral practice that require 
vindication. The expressivist view of consistency and validity, for example, is not 
viewed as inferior because it is less respectful of the important parts of actual moral 
argument – it is accepted that expressivists can vindicate these notions as they are 
employed by everyday moralizers.
18
 What is denied is that this vindication employs 
an understanding of these notions that is consonant with our most readily accepted 
view of them. But it is hard to see how this generates a reason to consider the 
expressivist vindication inferior. The fact (if it is a fact) that the realist theory of 
consistency and validity is more initially appealing provides no reason whatsoever to 
consider it correct, since its psychological attraction to us may be the result of all sorts 
of factors unconnected to its truth. For example, it may be due to the fact is the realist 




Another way of making this point as follows. Suppose, as proponents of weak 
presumptive arguments do, that the pragmatically important features of moral practice 
involve in themselves no explicit metaethical claims. In the case of the logical 
relations that exist between moral judgments the claim would be that all moral 
practice assumes is that certain combinations of commitment are inconsistent and 
hence that certain inferences are valid. Since it is the task of metaethics to give an 
account (and, it is arguable, a vindicating account) of such practices, it follows that it 
is the task of metaethics to give an account of the nature of consistency and validity. 
Therefore, the nature of these relations is an unresolved issue in metaethical dispute. 
Furthermore a presumption in favor of one particular theory cannot be grounded in a 
claim that reflects an unresolved issue in the debate between that theory and its rivals 
(see Loeb 2007 p.476). And since the issue of the nature of logical relations is an 
unresolved issue in metaethical dispute, one cannot take a particular position on that 
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 For an expressivist view of consistency and validity, see Blackburn 1998 p.72 and Gibbard 2003 
chapter 4.  For a further alternative to the realist model of consistency and validity, see Field 1977.  
19
 For a structurally similar point, see Rosen and Dorr 2002 p.158. 
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issue to generate a presumption in favor of realism. Therefore, by taking the 
presumption in favor of realism to depend on the adoption of certain theories of 
logical relations (for example) realists display an impoverished view of the sorts of 
issue to be determined in constructing a complete metaethical theory.
20
 We cannot, in 
short, support realism by tacitly assuming a realist view of consistency or validity (or 
belief, truth or knowledge or mind-independence or…) where that view is not 
reflected in the pragmatically important face-value of moral practice.  
 
One final way to interpret the claim of unnaturalness employed in weak 
presumptive arguments is as the claim that the antirealist vindicatory story of moral 
practice is not the same vindicatory story that it is plausible to tell when we consider 
other practices that exhibit structurally similar features to moral practice. The practice 
of reflecting, deliberating and arguing about tables, for example, exhibits analogues of 
all the features of moral discourse listed in §1(a) and shares with moral practice a 
undeniable pragmatic importance in our lives. In the case of this ‗table practice‘ a 
realist vindicatory story is plausible. The realist can then argue that her theory has an 
advantage of providing a unified account of structurally similar practices. As Finlay 
(2007 p.825) puts it:  
 
Whereas realism can simply take logical relations and talk of truth, facts, 
properties, and descriptions in the moral domain to be continuous with 
those in other domains, according to our best semantic and metaphysical 
theories, antirealists must either distinguish distinct moral equivalents for 
these, or defend radical revisions of our general theories.  
  
But this dilemma for the antirealist is a false one, because it mischaracterizes 
the antirealist position. The implication of Finlay‘s argument is that antirealists must 
take talk of truth, facts, logical relations and so on, to be discontinuous between the 
cases of table and moral practice (or else adopt a radically revisionary global 
antirealism). However, once we expunge the first error of reading any metatheory into 
the features of moral – or other – practice, the charge of discontinuity fails to stick. 
Antirealists about morality do not hold that in moral practice we assume an antirealist 
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 For an example of this error, see Finlay 2007 p.824. 
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understanding of ‗fact‘ whereas in table practice we assume a realist one. Rather, 
according to antirealism – and any metatheory properly responsive to the 
pragmatically important forms of actual practice – the practices in question should not 
be taken to involve any explicitly metatheoretical position, realist or antirealist. Talk 
of ‗facts‘ in table practice is continuous with the talk of ‗facts‘ in moral practice, since 
each employs the minimal and metatheoretically neutral sense of ‗fact‘ discussed in 
§6.1. Therefore, at the level of the ordinary engagement in the practice, there is no 
discontinuity. At the level of metatheoretical reflection antirealists do accept a 
discontinuity between the different vindicatory stories for the features of the 
respective practices. This, antirealists will admit, is a genuine discontinuity, but it is 
an innocuous one, because there is no reason to suppose that, at the metatheoretical 
level, the correct vindicatory account of our many and varied pragmatically important 
discursive practices is a uniform one. Indeed, given the obvious differences between 
the ways in which those practices are pragmatically important to us, a strong case can 
be made for thinking that correct vindicatory account of all of those practices will not 
be unified. Therefore the antirealist vindication of the features of moral discourse 
cannot be labeled unnatural on the basis of it being discontinuous with the vindicatory 
story given for table discourse.  
 
It remains a possibility that realists may have something else in mind when 
they claim that the vindicatory story provided by antirealists – and in particular 
expressivists – is unnatural. If so, it is their responsibility to articulate it. Until they do 
so, the conclusion is that, just like the strong arguments, no extant weak presumptive 




When it comes to moral practice, metaethics should leave everything as it is. At least, 
any theory that forces us to revise some of the pragmatically important elements of 
moral practice is by that token implausible. But when it comes to assessing whether or 
not a particular theory asks us to revise an important part of moral practice, and hence 
whether there is a presumption against it, we must be careful to do two things. First, 
we must delineate the proper content of the pragmatically important features of moral 
practice. If the arguments of §6 are right, many realists fail to do this since they 
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include in those features explicitly realist commitments. Second, we must appreciate 
the full extent of the resources available to the alternative – particularly expressivist – 
views in vindicating these features, once they have been metaethically cleansed. If the 
suggestions in §7 are correct, many realists fail to do this by systematically 
underdescribing the expressivist theory.  
 The above arguments do not warrant the conclusion that there is no possible 
presumptive argument for moral realism. The primary concern of this paper has been 
to show that presumptive arguments based on the features listed in §1(a) fail. This is 
significant, because most extant presumptive arguments focus on a subset of these 
features. Nevertheless, it remains a possibility that the realist could bring to our 
attention further features of moral practice that are both pragmatically important and 
impossible to vindicate from an antirealist perspective. The above arguments provide 
no objection to realists who argue against antirealism in this way. Nevertheless the 
above criticisms of extant presumptive arguments provides some reason to be 
pessimistic about all presumptive arguments. First because such arguments must 
avoid both horns of Kirchin‘s dilemma, and the history of failure of presumptive 
arguments failure to do so provides some support for the conclusion that all such 
arguments will be impaled in this way. Second and more importantly, because realists 
face an application of the law of diminishing returns should they offer presumptive 
arguments based on features other than the ones considered here. This is because the 
goal of any metatheory is to vindicate the pragmatically important features of moral 
practice and it is plausible to suppose that the features listed in §1(a) to a large extent 
exhaust this pragmatic importance. The further presumptive arguments depart from 
features on this list, therefore, the harder it is to support the claim that the relevant 
feature is pragmatically important, and the more plausible the antirealist response that 
the feature in question does not, after all, require vindication. To see how this 
dialectic might function, consider the assumption of fallibility. Although, as has been 
argued, it is plausible that this is a pragmatically important part of moral practice, it is 
far less plausible whether the notion of fundamental fallibility – that is, the possibility 
of an erroneous opinion that may persist once all oppurtunities for improving one‘s 
set of attitudes have been taken – is pragmatically important (see Egan 2007). In so 
far as this is doubtful, the expressivist has two chances to undermine the presumptive 
argument based on this feature: they may attempt a vindication, or they may deny the 
need for vindication. In general, the farther a presumptive argument departs from the 
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pragmatically important features listed in §1(a), the more persuasive this second 
response becomes. Thus, although the arguments presented here do not directly 
consider all possible presumptive arguments, they provide some (defeasible) reason to 
be skeptical of all such arguments. They establish a presumption against presumptive 
arguments.  
Finally, it is important to consider the effect of the rejection of presumptive 
arguments on the standard concerns of metaethics. As was argued in §1, at best 
presumptive arguments provide a defeasible case for realism: if they succeed they 
show that only realism can satisfy one desideratum of metaethical theorizing. This 
comparative advantage may or may not prove decisive in the light of further 
desiderata. But if the arguments here are correct, consideration of the face-value of 
moral practice underdetermines the correct metaethical theory; it provides no 
defeasible reason in favor of any particular metaethical theory, realist or otherwise. 
Therefore, considering how metaethical theories meet any further desiderata becomes 
crucially important. 
One candidate for an additional desideratum is consistency with our wider 
philosophical theories of metaphysics, epistemology, psychology and semantics. 
Since metaethical theories make claims about the metaphysical, epistemology, 
psychology and semantics of moral value, it seems reasonable to assess them by their 
consistency with our best philosophical theories of these matters (see Timmons 1999 
and McNaughton 1988 p.64; for skepticism see McDowell 1987). The acceptance of 
this desideratum in addition to that of face-savingness has had a large influence on 
triangulating the concerns and methods of recent metaethics. A common dialectic is 
as follows. First, realists seek to show how they can, but antirealists cannot, properly 
vindicate all of the features of moral practice (that is, they seek to generate the 
presumption). Second, realists seek to defend their view against objections to its 
metaphysical, epistemological, psychological and semantic claims (that is, they seek 
to show that the presumption is not outweighed). McNaughton (1988 pp.40-1) sums 
up this project: 
 
…the [presumptive] starting point of the argument influences its 
shape…The realist contention is that he only has to rebut the arguments 
designed to persuade us that moral realism is philosophically untenable in 
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order to make out his case. (See also Brink 1989 p.25 and Shafer-Landau 
2003 p.37.) 
 
This dialectic is particularly prevalent in book-length defenses of moral realism, such 
as those offered by McNaughton, Brink and Shafer-Landau, but also influences other 
contributions, such as those of Sinnott-Armstrong and Finlay. It generates particular, 
though different, concerns for realists and antirealists. For realists, the principal 
concern in light of this dialectic is to defend the plausibility of their metaphysical, 
epistemological, psychological and semantic claims, hoping that in doing so they have 
cleared the way for the presumption in favor of their view to turn decisive. For 
antirealists the principal concern has been either to accept the presumption and show 
that the considerations against moral realism can outweigh the presumption in favor 
(see Mackie 1977 pp.36-42) or to seek to undermine the presumption by providing the 
required vindications (see Blackburn 1993 and 1998). But if the above arguments are 
correct, focusing on these areas will not suffice to determine any important 
metaethical issues. On the realist side, it is will no longer be enough to defend the 
plausibility of their wider philosophical claims whilst leaving the presumptive case as 
the only positive argument: they must instead employ these claims in positive 
arguments for their position. For antirealists, guarding against the re-emergence of a 
presumptive case by laying out the detail of their vindicatory story will remain vital, 
but it will not be enough to provide a comprehensive defense of antirealism. In 
addition, antirealists must argue positively in favor of their metaphysical, 
epistemological, psychological and semantic claims. Little existing work in 
metaethics addresses these concerns. If the above considerations are on the right lines, 
therefore, they necessitate a significant redrawing of the proper boundaries of 
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